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REORGANIZING IN THE WAKE OF MISSION 
PROD. HOLDINGS V. TEMPNOLOGY: HOW TO 
ADDRESS THE TRADEMARK AND BANKRUPTCY 
LAW ISSUES CREATED BY THE SUPREME 
COURT’S RECENT DECISION 
Kayla N. Ghasemi* 
Bankruptcy law seeks to provide a “fresh start” for debtors and an eq-
uitable distribution of funds to creditors.  Trademark law, on the other hand, 
aims to ensure proper source identification and protect the public from de-
ception.  These policies converge when a trademark owner or licensor has 
licensed use of the mark to others and hopes to reject this licensing agree-
ment in bankruptcy.  Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Mission Prod. 
Holdings v. Tempnology, LLC, there was a circuit split regarding the licen-
see’s rights upon the bankruptcy of and rejection by the licensor.  Some cir-
cuits held that the licensee’s rights terminated upon rejection, while others 
held that the rights continued. 
The Supreme Court ultimately resolved these conflicting positions and 
held that rejection of a trademark license operates as a breach under applica-
ble state law, which allows the licensee’s rights to survive the bankruptcy.  
While this result seems fair for the licensee who may rely on use of the mark 
to keep its business afloat, there are certain bankruptcy and trademark issues 
that may arise such as increased difficulty in reorganization for the licensor, 
as well as the possibility of naked licensing and abandonment.  This Com-
ment explores these potential legal implications, considers legislative 
amendment, and suggests that practitioners draft contracts accordingly to 
help manage possible risks created by the Mission decision. 
                                                          
* J.D. Candidate, 2021, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles.  The author wishes to acknowledge in-
sights from her faculty advisor, Jennifer Rothman, Professor of Law at LMU Loyola Law School 
in Los Angeles, who inspired the topic and provided a valuable perspective on trademark law, and 
the writing process overall.  The author would also like to acknowledge her friend, Bradford Barn-
hardt, for his thoughtful contribution and perspective on bankruptcy law, as well as the Loyola 
Entertainment Law Review staffers and editors for their hard work.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Supreme Court’s 2019 decision in Mission Prod. Holdings v. 
Tempnology, LLC (“Mission”) answered a long-debated question regarding 
the fate of trademark licenses when a licensor files for bankruptcy, but it also 
created a number of questions in the areas of intellectual property and bank-
ruptcy law that reorganizing licensors will have to grapple with for years to 
come.  Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Mission, some circuits held 
that the licensee’s rights to use the trademark were extinguished upon the 
filing of bankruptcy by the licensor,1 while other circuits held the opposite, 
concluding that a licensee’s rights continued beyond the bankruptcy of the 
licensor.2   
In Mission, the Supreme Court resolved this circuit split, holding that a 
debtor’s express rejection of a trademark license in bankruptcy could not 
unilaterally deprive the licensee of its rights to use the trademark.3  While 
the decision may seem like a win for trademark licensees, it was decided 
solely on the basis of bankruptcy law and not trademark law.4  This Com-
ment will delve into the questions left open by Mission.  For instance, under 
bankruptcy law, the decision could make it more difficult for trademark li-
censors to restructure.  Specifically, reorganizing debtors in bankruptcy must 
propose a feasible Chapter 11 plan that outlines the manner in which credi-
tors will be repaid.  To receive a discharge—that is, to no longer remain 
liable on pre-bankruptcy debts—the debtor’s creditors must vote to approve 
the plan.  If the debtor is forced to expend scarce resources to maintain a 
trademark, it will have less money to allocate to its creditors, making credi-
tors less likely to vote in favor of the plan.  The Mission decision therefore 
implicates a core policy of the bankruptcy system. 
Additionally, under trademark law, there is a potential for consumer 
confusion as to who is standing behind a product, and trademark rights them-
selves could be extinguished as a result of a lack of supervision by the debtor-
licensor of the licensee’s products.  The failure to supervise the products and 
                                                          
1. In re Tempnology, LLC, 879 F.3d 389, 395 (1st Cir. 2018), rev’d sub nom., Mission 
Prod. Holdings, Inc. v. Tempnology, LLC, 139 S. Ct. 1652 (2019).  
2. Sunbeam Prod., Inc. v. Chicago Am. Mfg., LLC, 686 F.3d 372, 377 (7th Cir. 2012).  
3. Mission Prod. Holdings, Inc. v. Tempnology, LLC, 139 S. Ct. 1652, 1666 (2019).  
4. Id. at 1657.  
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services of a licensee can result in what is called “naked licensing,” and lead 
to a determination that a mark has been abandoned by the licensor.5 
Practitioners will need to be cognizant of and address these issues in 
licensing agreements going forward since they will continue to raise unset-
tled questions in the context of bankruptcy.  Alternatively, Congress could 
ameliorate some of the challenges created by Mission by amending the 
United States Bankruptcy Code (“Bankruptcy Code”) or the Lanham Act.  
This Comment will propose several approaches to address these issues.  In 
Part II, this Comment provides the foundational aspects of trademark and 
bankruptcy law that inform the Mission decision and the current challenges.  
Part III describes the circuit split that set up the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Mission and analyzes the Supreme Court’s decision in the case.  Part IV con-
siders the implications of the decision, including some unresolved questions 
and potentially negative consequences.  Finally, Part V considers potential 
legislative solutions and proposes ways in which thoughtful contract drafting 
and negotiation could avoid possible pitfalls created by the Mission decision. 
II. BACKGROUND OF LAW 
In bankruptcy, a corporate debtor who has over-extended itself to cred-
itors must either choose to dissolve or reorganize and create a payment plan 
to repay its creditors.6  A bankruptcy debtor must also decide what to do with 
its existing contractual obligations.7  It may “assume” a contract and remain 
bound by its obligations, or it may “reject” a contract and be released of its 
obligations.8  The rejection of an executory contract—a contract where there 
is performance due on both sides, such as a trademark-licensing agreement—
operates as a breach of contract.9  This portion of the Comment discusses the 
relevant areas of law. 
                                                          
 5. 2 ANNE GILSON LALONDE, GILSON ON TRADEMARKS § 6.04 (2020).  
 6. 1 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 1.01 (Richard Levin & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed. 
2020); Process - Bankruptcy Basics, U.S. CTS., https://www.uscourts.gov/services-forms/bank-
ruptcy/bankruptcy-basics/process-bankruptcy-basics [https://perma.cc/BXJ9-9NNM].  
7.  Process - Bankruptcy Basics, supra note 6.   
8. 11 U.S.C. § 365 (2018); see also Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy - Assumption and 
Rejection, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., https://www.justice.gov/jm/civil-resource-manual-60-executory-
contracts-bankruptcy [https://perma.cc/8KZE-JHRE].  
9. In re Tempnology, LLC, 879 F.3d 389, 395–96 (1st Cir. 2018), rev’d sub nom., Mission 
Prod. Holdings, Inc. v. Tempnology, LLC, 139 S. Ct. 1652 (2019).  
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A. Trademark Licensing 
Owners of trademarks often grant licenses for use of their marks in ex-
change for royalties.10  This is done through a licensing agreement in which 
the trademark owner, or licensor, grants another, the licensee, the right to use 
the mark “for the purposes specified in the license agreement.”11  The licens-
ing agreement also “protects the licensee from an infringement suit by the 
licensor for such use.”12  Additionally, a trademark license may be exclusive 
or non-exclusive.13  An exclusive license grants rights to use a mark to only 
one licensee, while a nonexclusive license agreement may grant that right to 
others, including the licensor, allowing others to use the mark contempora-
neously.14  The memorialization of such an agreement protects the licensor 
in the event of a dispute and sets forth terms which specify what the licensee 
may and may not do with the mark.15   
A cornerstone of the trademark licensing agreement is “[c]ontrol over 
the nature and quality” of the goods.16  Accordingly, licensing agreements 
typically set forth quality control obligations, which require that both the li-
censor and licensee maintain the quality and value of the mark to prevent 
derogation or dilution and requires that they maintain the mark as an indica-
tor of source and sponsorship.17 
                                                          
10. WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., MODULE 12: TRADEMARK LICENSING, https://
www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/sme/en/documents/pdf/ip_panorama_12_learning_points.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/ST7V-RZTB]. 
 11. Richard M. Cieri & Michelle M. Morgan, Licensing Intellectual Property and Technol-
ogy from the Financially-Troubled or Startup Company: Prebankruptcy Strategies to Minimize the 
Risk in A Licensee’s Intellectual Property and Technology Investment, 55 BUS. LAW. 1649, 1658 
(2000).  
12. Id. at 1658–69. 
 13. 2 ANNE GILSON LALONDE, GILSON ON TRADEMARKS § 6.07 (2020).  
14. 2 ROGER M. MILGRIM & ERIC E. BENSEN, MILGRIM ON LICENSING § 15.08 (2020); 2 
ROGER M. MILGRIM & ERIC E. BENSEN, MILGRIM ON LICENSING § 15.34 (2020).  
15.  GILSON LALONDE, supra note 13, § 6.07.  
16.  GILSON LALONDE, supra note 5, § 6.04; see generally Barcamerica Int’l USA Tr. v. 
Tyfield Imps., 289 F.3d 589, 595 (9th Cir. 2002); FreecycleSunnyvale v. Freecycle Network, 626 
F.3d 509, 515 (9th Cir. 2010). 
17. Bach v. Forever Living Prod. U.S., Inc., 473 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1120–22 (W.D. Wash. 
2007); GILSON LALONDE, supra note 13, § 6.07. 
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While it is not mandatory to have a provision in the contract setting 
forth quality control, a licensor must supervise the quality and production of 
products or provision of services under the owner’s mark.18  In the absence 
of such oversight, a license may become “naked” as a result of the lack of “a 
meaningful assurance of quality.”19  Despite the evocative terminology, the 
term “naked licensing” indicates that the licensor is not supervising the man-
ner in which the licensee is using the mark nor whether the products or ser-
vices are similar to or of equal quality to its own.20  Naked licensing of a 
mark may also occur “when a licensor allows a licensee to use the mark on 
any quality or type of good that the licensee chooses.”21 
Failure to provide such supervision indicates that the mark no longer 
functions as a source-identifier and has become unmoored from its underly-
ing product or service.22  As such, under section 45 of the Lanham Act, naked 
licensing constitutes abandonment, and consequently causes a forfeiture of 
the rights to the mark.23 
The policy behind this law is to protect the public from being de-
ceived.24  In the absence of supervision, the public could be deceived due to 
potential misrepresentation as to the connection between the goods or ser-
vices and their source, regardless of quality level.25  The public may also 
                                                          
18. Miller v. Glenn Miller Prods., Inc., 454 F.3d 975, 992 (9th Cir. 2006) (“A license agree-
ment need not contain an express quality control provision because trademark law, rather than the 
contract itself, confers on the licensor the right and obligation to exercise quality control.”) (em-
phasis added).  
19.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 33 (AM. L. INST. 1995); Bach, 473 
F. Supp. 2d at 1120; Barcamerica, 289 F.3d at 596. 
20.  GILSON LALONDE, supra note 5, § 6.04. 
21. Stanfield v. Osborne Indus., Inc., 52 F.3d 867, 871 (10th Cir. 1995) (finding that the 
licensor lost its rights to a trademark when granting the licensee the uncontrolled right to use the 
mark in conjunction with any and all goods the licensee manufactured); 3 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, 
MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 18:38 (5th ed. 2020).  
22.  GILSON LALONDE, supra note 5, § 6.04. 
23. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2018) (stating that a mark will be deemed to be abandoned “[w]hen 
any course of conduct of the owner, including acts of omission as well as commission, causes the 
mark . . . to lose its significance as a mark”); GILSON LALONDE, supra note 5, § 6.04. 
24.  See GILSON LALONDE, supra note 5, § 6.04. 
25. Id.; Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart’s Food Stores, Inc., 267 F.2d 358, 367 (2d Cir. 1959) (In 
the absence of supervision, “the risk that the public will be unwittingly deceived will be increased 
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likely be confused as to whether the licensor truly endorses the products that 
consumers might purchase from the licensee.26 
Naked licensing “erodes the significance of the designation as an accu-
rate indication of origin: a trademark,”27 which is rooted in the rationale that 
the “public has a right to expect consistent quality of goods or services asso-
ciated with the trademark.”28  Accordingly, a trademark holder that licenses 
its mark must protect that quality or risk losing rights to that mark.29  While 
there is no bright-line rule regarding the level of control necessary to prevent 
abandonment, courts have considered “whether the [licensor] (1) retained 
express contractual control over the [licensee’s] quality control measures, 
(2) had actual controls over the quality control measures, and (3) was unrea-
sonable in relying on the quality control measures.”30 
Barcamerica Int’l USA Trust v. Tyfield Imps., Inc. illustrates the need 
for actual quality control, especially in the absence of a contractual obliga-
tion to do so.31  In 1988 and 1989, Barcamerica, owner of the Leonardo Da 
Vinci mark, entered into licensing agreements with Renaissance Vineyards 
(“Renaissance”) for use of its Leonardo Da Vinci mark on Renaissance’s 
wine products in the United States.32  These agreements did not contain a 
provision setting forth quality control obligations.33 
Competitor Cantine Leonardo Da Vinci Soc. Coop. a.r.l. (“Cantine”), 
a producer of wine in Vinci, Italy, also sold wine products which bore the 
                                                          
. . . [and] the only effective way to protect the public . . . is to place on the licensor the affirmative 
duty of policing in a reasonable manner the activities of his licensees.”).  
26.  GILSON LALONDE, supra note 5, § 6.04. 
 27.  3 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION 
§ 18:48 (5th ed. 2020).  
28. Taco Cabana Int’l, Inc. v. Two Pesos, Inc., 932 F.2d 1113, 1121 (5th Cir. 1991); Ken-
tucky Fried Chicken Corp. v. Diversified Packaging Corp., 549 F.2d 368, 387 (5th Cir. 1977).  
29. Lanham (Trademark) Act of 1964 § 14, 15 U.S.C. § 1064 (2018).  
30.  Lawn Managers, Inc. v. Progressive Lawn Managers, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 3d 975, 976 
(E.D. Mo. 2018); 15 U.S.C. § 1064; FreecycleSunnyvale v. Freecycle Network, 626 F.3d 509, 512 
(9th Cir. 2010). 
31. See generally Barcamerica Int’l USA Tr. v. Tyfield Imps., 289 F.3d 589 (9th Cir. 2002).  
 32. Id. at 592.  
33. Id. 
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same Leonardo Da Vinci mark since 1972, and has sold its wine American 
importers since 1979.34  In 1996, Tyfield Importers, Inc. (“Tyfield”) became 
the “exclusive United States importer and distributor of Cantine wine prod-
ucts bearing the ‘Leonardo Da Vinci’ mark.”35  Cantine became aware of 
Barcamerica’s registration of the same mark when it was in the process of 
“prosecuting its first trademark application in the United States.”36  Cantine 
determined that Barcamerica was no longer selling wine products with the 
marks, and sought to have the mark declared abandoned and therefore can-
celled in an action with the Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”).37  Bar-
camerica moved to suspend the cancellation proceeding, and the PTO 
granted the motion.38  Barcamerica then moved for a preliminary injunction 
to prevent Cantine and Tyfield from continued use of the “Leonardo Da 
Vinci” mark.39  The district court denied the motion on the grounds that there 
was a “serious question as to whether [Barcamerica] will be able to . . . over-
come [the] claim of abandonment.”40  Barcamerica then appealed.41 
On appeal, Barcamerica argued that even though there was a lack of 
supervision over the mark, it was not considered a naked license because 
Renaissance made objectively “good wine,” and therefore the public was not 
deceived.42  To support this argument Barcamerica relied on the testimony 
of its principal, George Gino Barca, stating that he “occasionally [and] in-
formally tasted . . . the [Renaissance] wine” and that he relied on the reputa-
tion of a “world-famous winemaker” employed by Renaissance at the time 
the agreements were signed.43 
                                                          
34. Id.  
35. Id.  
36. Id. at 593.  
37. Id.  
38. Id.  
39. Id. 
 40. Id.  
41. Id. 
 42. Id. at 597. 
 43. Id. at 592.  
GHASEMI_MACROS_V5 (DO NOT DELETE) 1/5/2021  12:00 PM 
46 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:1 
However, the court held that whether the wine was good or bad was 
irrelevant to the determination of whether the license had become “naked” 
and therefore abandoned.44  The court concluded that Barcamerica and Re-
naissance lacked “the type of close working relationship required to establish 
adequate quality control in the absence of a formal agreement.”45  The court 
held that “[b]oth the terms of the licensing agreements and the manner in 
which they were carried out show that [Barcamerica] engaged in naked li-
censing of the ‘Leonardo Da Vinci’ mark.”46  Further, the court held that “it 
is well established that where a trademark owner engages in naked licensing, 
without any control over the quality of goods produced by the licensee, such 
a practice is inherently deceptive and constitutes abandonment of any rights 
to the trademark by the licensor.”47 
There are, however, instances where courts have found adequate qual-
ity control without the involvement of the licensor.48  Where there is a “spe-
cial relationship between the parties, such as a familial relationship or a long 
period of close business association[,]” courts have held that licensors were 
justified in relying on licensees for quality control.49  For example, courts 
have found that a special relationship existed where the licensor and licensee 
were commonly owned, and where “family members . . . cooperated in 
                                                          
44. Id. at 597–98.  
45. Id. at 597; See, e.g., Taco Cabana Int’l, Inc. v. Two Pesos, Inc., 932 F.2d 1113, 1122 
(5th Cir. 1991) (The licensor and licensee were engaged in a close working relationship for eight 
years); Transgo, Inc. v. AJAC Transmission Parts Corp., 768 F.2d 1001, 1017–18 (9th Cir. 
1985) (The licensor was the manufacturer of 90% of the components sold by the licensee and had 
a ten year working relationship); Taffy Original Designs, Inc. v. Taffy’s, Inc., No. 65C345, 1966 
WL 7124, at *9 (N.D. Ill. 1966) (The licensor and licensee were sisters and in business together for 
seventeen years, licensee’s company was a continuation of the sisters’ prior company, and the li-
censor occasionally visited the licensee’s store and was satisfied with the quality of the merchandise 
offered); Arner v. Sharper Image Corp., No. CV94-1713 ABC (BOR), 1995 WL 873730, at *5 
(C.D. Cal. 1995) (The licensor enjoyed a close working relationship with its licensee’s employees 
and the license agreement provided that the license would terminate if certain employees ceased to 
be affiliated with licensee). 
46. Barcamerica, 289 F.3d at 597. 
47. Id. at 598 (citing First Interstate Bancorp v. Stenquist, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19426, 
16 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1704, 1706 (N.D. Cal. 1990)). 
 48. Edward K. Esping, Annotation, Granting of “Naked” or Unsupervised License to Third 
Party as Abandonment of Trademark, 118 A.L.R. Fed. 211 (1994).  
49. 3 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION 
§ 18:57 (5th ed. 2020).  
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running related businesses[,]” among other scenarios.50  This seems to indi-
cate that in the event of a bankruptcy and lack of supervision by a debtor-
licensor, it is possible that the mark will not be forfeited so long as the licen-
sor-licensee relationship is of the kind that courts recognize as establishing 
adequate quality control, and the licensee maintains the original quality of 
the mark. 
On the opposite end of the spectrum, in Monster, Inc. v. Dolby Labor-
atories Licensing Corp. (“Monster, Inc.”), the court held that naked licens-
ing, and therefore abandonment, did not occur because the licensor exercised 
proper quality control.51  In Monster, Inc., Plaintiff-Licensee Monster, Inc. 
(“Monster”) sought “judicial declaration that the Monster Headphone Mark 
[did] not infringe any trademark rights of [Defendant-Licensor] Dolby La-
boratories Licensing Corporation (‘Dolby’) in its Dolby Headphone 
Mark.”52  Dolby then filed a counterclaim against Monster alleging trade-
mark infringement to which Monster responded with a claim that Dolby en-
gaged in naked licensing.53  Dolby argued that Monster was “estopped from 
claiming naked licensing based upon a failure to police the quality of Mon-
ster’s use of the trademark[]” because a licensee is precluded from “chal-
lenging the validity of the licensor’s trademark based upon conduct that oc-
curred during the life of its license, particularly with respect to the licensee 
itself.”54  The court found that, “[a]ssuming Monster may nevertheless chal-
lenge the validity of the trademark based upon evidence of Dolby’s failure 
to police others’ use of the mark,” there was adequate quality control by li-
censor Dolby, and therefore, naked licensing did not occur.55  The court in 
                                                          
50. Id.; Doeblers’ Pennsylvania Hybrids, Inc. v. Doebler, 442 F.3d 812, 824 (3d Cir. 2006), 
as amended, (May 5, 2006) (“[L]itigants were closely-held business entities owned and managed 
by family members and which included a high degree of interlocking ownership and control[,]” 
and therefore enjoyed a “special relationship.”). 
 51. Monster, Inc. v. Dolby Labs. Licensing Corp., 920 F. Supp. 2d 1066, 1078 (N.D. Cal. 
2013).  
52. Id. at 1070.  
53. Id.  
54. Id. at 1076–77; see also Pac. Supply Coop. v. Farmers Union Cent. Exch., 318 F.2d 
894, 908 (9th Cir. 1963); STX, Inc. v. Bauer USA, Inc., No. C 96–1140 FMS, 1997 WL 337578 at 
*10 (N.D.Cal. June 5, 1997); Creative Gifts, Inc. v. UFO, 235 F.3d 540, 548 (10th Cir. 2000); Prof’l 
Golfers Ass’n of Am. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 514 F.2d 665, 671 (5th Cir. 1975).  
55. Monster, Inc., 920 F. Supp 2d at 1077. 
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Monster, Inc. noted that “[t]he Ninth Circuit has not settled on an exact 
standard of proof required for establishing a naked licensing claim,” but be-
cause the theory “is essentially one of forfeiture of trademark rights,” the 
standard has been described as “stringent.”56   
In Monster, Inc., Dolby required its licensee Monster “to abide by its 
guidelines for use of the mark and use of the Dolby headphone technol-
ogy.”57  As a precondition to use of the mark, Dolby also required its licen-
sees to send “prototype products for testing to ensure” that quality standards 
were met.58  Additionally, Dolby “require[d] licensees to abide by certain 
guidelines for its use and display” of the trademark.59  Dolby also employed 
a monitoring software which would identify “similar, potentially confusing 
marks[] in the marketplace[,] . . . a compliance team in the field, evaluation 
of customer reports, and partner[ed] with customs officials[]” to police the 
mark.60  Further, Dolby “engage[d] in enforcement efforts” if unauthorized 
or infringing uses were found.61  While there were lapses in Dolby’s policing 
of the mark and quality, these lapses did not meet the stringent standard re-
quired by the naked licensing doctrine.62  Accordingly the court found that 
Dolby exercised proper quality control and therefore naked licensing could 
not exist.63   
This legal framework presents a problem when it comes to bankruptcy 
because a restructuring licensor will likely be unable to engage in quality 
control due to its limited resources.  Although the level of quality control a 
licensor needs will depend on the product and license at issue,64 quality 
                                                          
 56. Id. at 1076 (citing FreecycleSunnyvale, 626 F.3d 509, 514–15 (9th Cir. 2010). 
57. Monster, Inc., 920 F. Supp 2d at 1077. 
58. Id. 
 59. Id.  
60. Id.  
61. Id.  
62. Id.  
63. Id. at 1078. 
 64. See Theodore Chiacchio, Top Tips for Maintaining Adequate Quality Control Over 
Trademark Licensees, IPWATCHDOG (Dec. 2, 2019), https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2019/12/02
/top-tips-maintaining-adequate-quality-control-trademark-licensees/id=116485/ [https://perma.cc
/D3Y5-CFC7] (“A determination as to whether or not a trademark owner/licensor maintains 
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control can be expensive.65  For a debtor-licensor with scarce resources, 
costly quality control might not be possible.  Likewise, a liquidating licensor 
will not be able to exercise quality control because it will have to sell off its 
assets as part of the bankruptcy estate.66  Because the mark must be sold 
along with the goods or services attached to it, a purchaser of the assets at 
auction must maintain quality control or risk abandonment.67  As this Com-
ment later proposes, this issue may be resolved by contract or by amendment 
of the Lanham Act. 
B. A Background of Bankruptcy Law and its Intersection with 
Intellectual Property Law 
Bankruptcy aims to provide debtors with a fresh start and to distribute 
funds equitably to creditors.68  In a 1934 decision, the Supreme Court stated 
that the purpose of bankruptcy law is to give “the honest but unfortunate 
debtor . . . a new opportunity in life and a clear field for future effort, unham-
pered by the pressure and discouragement of preexisting debt.”69  This is 
accomplished through the discharge of burdensome debts of the debtor.70   
Upon the filing of bankruptcy, a separate legal entity called the bank-
ruptcy estate is created.71  A bankruptcy estate is comprised of “the debtor’s 
assets at the moment of filing, as well as the proceeds of such property and 
                                                          
sufficient control over a licensee’s products or services is a fact-intensive analysis determined on a 
case-by-case basis.”).  
65. Mission Prod. Holdings, Inc. v. Tempnology, LLC, 139 S. Ct. 1652, 1665 (2019) (Alt-
hough this argument was raised by the losing party, the Supreme Court noted it and did not seem 
to reject it). 
 66. Chapter 7 – Bankruptcy Basics, U.S. CTS., https://www.uscourts.gov/services-forms
/bankruptcy/bankruptcy-basics/chapter-7-bankruptcy-basics [https://perma.cc/QL4D-3XL7].  
67. GILSON LALONDE, supra note 13, § 6.07. 
68. 9 AM. JUR. 2D Bankruptcy § 6 (2020); Process - Bankruptcy Basics, supra note 6. 
 69. Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934).  
70. Process - Bankruptcy Basics, supra note 6.   
71. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (2018).  
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any additional property interests the estate may acquire later.”72  Next, a 
mechanism called an “automatic stay” is instated to prevent any action 
against the debtor or property and to “preserve the bankruptcy estate until all 
of the debtor’s assets can be collected and its creditors brought together to 
adjudicate their rights in the estate.”73   
A corporate entity can file bankruptcy under Chapter 7 or Chapter 11 
of the Bankruptcy Code.74  When a company files for bankruptcy under 
Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code, its assets are liquidated at auction, funds 
are distributed to creditors, and the company ceases to exist.75  Chapter 11, 
by contrast, envisions a reorganization process where the existence of the 
debtor survives.76  Upon the filing of bankruptcy, the debtor becomes a 
“debtor in possession,” and the debtor’s business and management remain in 
place.77  In a Chapter 11 case, the debtor will generally repay its creditors 
with allocations of its income over time.78  “In order to best maximize the 
value of the estate, the debtor in possession may be forced to breach contracts 
that, at the time of bankruptcy, are economically inefficient.”79  Section 
365(a) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that a trustee “may assume or reject 
any executory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor.”80  While the Bank-
ruptcy Code does not define the term “executory contract,” it is generally 
                                                          
72. Peter S. Menell, Bankruptcy Treatment of Intellectual Property Assets: An Economic 
Analysis, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 733, 752 (2007). 
73. Id.  
74. See Chapter 7 – Bankruptcy Basics, supra note 66.  
75. Process - Bankruptcy Basics, supra note 6; see Chapter 7 – Bankruptcy Basics, supra 
note 66.  
76. Process - Bankruptcy Basics, supra note 6.  
77. Chapter 11 - Bankruptcy Basics, U.S. CTS., https://www.uscourts.gov/services-forms
/bankruptcy/bankruptcy-basics/chapter-11-bankruptcy-basics [https://perma.cc/URH4-F4SQ]. 
 78. Id.  
 79. Clayton A. Smith, Comment, It’s Not You, It’s Us: Assessing the Contribution of Trade-
mark Goodwill to Properly Balance the Results of Trademark License Rejection, 35 EMORY 
BANKR. DEV. J. 267, 271 (2019); see COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 1.01, supra note 6.  
80. 11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (2018). 
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considered to be a contract “on which performance is due to some extent on 
both sides.”81   
Rejection of an executory contract constitutes a breach.82  One type of 
executory contract is a trademark license agreement to the extent that there 
is performance due on both sides.83  Such a license grants “one party the right 
to use another party’s mark (i.e., to engage in otherwise infringing activity) 
in a specified manner, generally in exchange for a royalty or other pay-
ment.”84  Because a trademark license is only valid if “the licensor exercises 
control over the nature and quality of the goods and/or services sold by the 
licensee under the licensed mark[,]” issues of naked licensing, and therefore 
abandonment, arise in the context of bankruptcy of the licensors.85  The im-
plications of a breach of an executory contract, specifically a trademark li-
cense agreement, were discussed in Mission, and will be explained in depth 
in the next section. 
For a Chapter 7 debtor, the survival of a trademark, if at all, will not 
exist with the original owner.86  The debtor’s assets, including its intellectual 
property portfolio, will be sold at a bankruptcy auction, the debtor will be 
wound up (i.e., voluntarily dissolved), and will cease to exist.87  A trademark 
cannot be sold “in gross,” meaning separate from the underlying goods or 
services.88  The mark must be sold along with, or appurtenant to, the goods 
                                                          
81. In re Tempnology, LLC, 879 F.3d 389, 395-96 (1st Cir. 2018), rev’d sub nom., Mission 
Prod. Holdings, Inc. v. Tempnology, LLC 139 S. Ct. 1652 (2019); see In re FBI Distrib. Corp., 330 
F.3d 36, 40 n.5 (1st Cir. 2003) (quoting NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 522 n.6).  
82. 11 U.S.C. § 365(g) (“[T]he rejection of an executory contract or unexpired lease of the 
debtor constitutes a breach of such contract or lease . . . immediately before the date of the filing of 
the petition . . .”). 
83. In re Tempnology, LLC, 879 F.3d at 395–96.  
84. 4 LOUIS ALTMAN & MALLA POLLACK, CALLMANN ON UNFAIR COMPETITION, 
TRADEMARKS, AND MONOPOLIES § 20:54 (4th ed. 2019). 
85.  MCCARTHY, supra note 21, § 18:38.  
 86. Chapter 7 – Bankruptcy Basics, supra note 66. 
 87. CAL. CORP. CODE § 1903(a) (West 2020) (using “voluntary dissolution” and “winding 
up the corporation” synonymously); Chapter 7 – Bankruptcy Basics, supra note 66.  
88. 15 U.S.C. § 1060 (2018).  
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or services associated with it.89  A purchaser at a bankruptcy auction could 
buy the entire company including the trademark(s) and then maintain quality 
control so as to avoid abandonment.  Alternatively, a purchaser could buy a 
segment of the company along with only certain marks pertaining to that 
segment and maintain quality control. 
For example, if Starbucks were to file for Chapter 7 bankruptcy, one 
could purchase the entire company and continue its predecessor’s operations 
in a similar line of business while engaging in quality control.  Alternatively, 
it could purchase only the coffee beans segment or the retail store segment 
and maintain similar quality so that the licensee’s rights do not terminate.  If 
the business or assets associated with a trademark were not purchased at auc-
tion, or if quality control was not maintained, the mark would evaporate. 
For a Chapter 11 debtor, however, the survival of a trademark license 
could have a significant impact on its ability to successfully reorganize be-
cause the approval of a Chapter 11 reorganization plan rests with the credi-
tors of the debtor.  To receive a discharge under Chapter 11, the debtor must 
propose a plan of reorganization that outlines how the debtor will repay its 
creditors.90  The debtor’s creditors will then vote on this plan.91  If the plan 
does not propose to pay the creditors enough, the creditors will presumably 
vote against it, however the court has the discretion to approve the plan not-
withstanding.92  Notably, a Chapter 11 debtor cannot receive a discharge of 
its prebankruptcy liabilities without a plan approval.93  In other words, for a 
Chapter 11 debtor to receive its fresh start, its creditors, or the court, must 
approve its plan of reorganization based on the voting requirements set forth 
in Chapter 11 of the United States Code section 1129.  In certain cases, ap-
proval may be unlikely if the debtor is required to use its limited funds to 
maintain the quality of a trademark because the cost of quality control varies 
depending on the nature of the mark.94  Once the Chapter 11 debtor’s plan is 
approved, it must still make its payments under the plan, or else risk 
                                                          
89. Id.  
 90. Process - Bankruptcy Basics, supra note 6.  
91. Id. 
 92. See Chapter 11 - Bankruptcy Basics, supra note 77.  
93. Id.  
94. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129 (2018).  
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dismissal of its bankruptcy case or conversion to a Chapter 7 bankruptcy.95  
This potential outcome is in direct contravention of the fresh start for deserv-
ing debtors. 
C. Lubrizol Enters 
The court in Lubrizol Enters., Inc. v. Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc. 
(“Lubrizol”) was the first to decide the effect of rejection of an intellectual 
property license, specifically a patent, after the licensor filed for bank-
ruptcy.96  In Lubrizol, Richmond Metal Finishers (“RMF”), a debtor-licen-
sor, entered into a technology licensing agreement with Lubrizol granting a 
nonexclusive patent license to use a “metal coating process technology.”97  
Over a year later, RMF filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy and sought to reject 
the license agreement.98  The Fourth Circuit indicated that the licensing 
agreement was executory as to each party and was executory under Title 11 
of United States Code, § 365(a).99  The court held that “Lubrizol would be 
entitled to treat rejection as a breach and seek money damages,” but stated it 
could not retain its rights under the original licensing agreement by continu-
ing to use the technology.100  Specifically, the court reasoned: 
Even though § 365(g) treats rejection as breach, the legislative 
history of § 365(g) makes clear that the purpose of the provision 
is to provide only a damages remedy for the non-bankrupt party 
. . . [T]he statutory ‘breach’ contemplated by § 365(g) controls, 
and provides only a money damages remedy for the non-bankrupt 
                                                          
95. 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b)(4)(N) (listing “material default” under a confirmed Chapter 11 
plan as sufficient “cause” for dismissal or conversion). 
 96.  See Lubrizol Enters., Inc. v. Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc., 756 F.2d 1043, 1044–45 
(4th Cir. 1985).  
97. Id. at 1045. 
 98. Id.  
99. Id.  
100. Id at 1048.  
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party. Allowing specific performance would obviously undercut 
the core purpose of rejection under § 365(a)[.]101 
Therefore, the Fourth Circuit concluded that a “rejection of an intellectual 
property license deprived the licensee of all rights previously granted under 
the license.”102  Congress enacted § 365(n) to, in effect, overrule the decision 
in Lubrizol.103  Section 365(n) allows a licensee of “intellectual property” to 
“retain certain rights under the contract,” notwithstanding rejection by the 
debtor-licensor.104  Section 365(n) specifically provides: 
(1) If the trustee rejects an executory contract under which the 
debtor is a licensor of a right to intellectual property, the licen-
see under such contract may elect–(A) to treat such contract as 
terminated by such rejection . . . or (B) to retain its rights . . . un-
der such contract . . . to such intellectual property . . .  as such 
rights existed immediately before the case commenced . . . (2) If 
the licensee elects to retain its rights, as described in paragraph 
(1)(B) of this subsection, under such contract–(A) the trustee 
shall allow the licensee to exercise such rights; (B) the licensee 
shall make all royalty payments due under such contract for the 
duration of such contract and for any period described in para-
graph (1)(B) of this subsection for which the licensee extends 
such contract . . . .105 
The Senate Report asserts that the purpose of the enactment of § 365(n) was 
“to make clear that the rights of an intellectual property licensee to use the 
licensed property cannot be unilaterally cut off as a result of the rejection of 
the license pursuant to § 365 in the event of the licensor’s bankruptcy.”106  
While § 365(n) protects licensees of intellectual property, the term “intellec-
tual property” as used in the Bankruptcy Code does not include 
                                                          
101. Id.  
102. In re Tempnology LLC, 559 B.R. 809, 816 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2016). 
103. Id.; 11 U.S.C. § 365 (2018). 
104. In re Tempnology LLC, 559 B.R. at 816 (rev’d on other grounds). 
105. 11 U.S.C. § 365(n).  
106. S. REP. NO. 100–505, at 1 (1988), as reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3200, 3201–02.  
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trademarks.107  Section 101(35A) of the Bankruptcy Code defines intellec-
tual property.108  It provides: 
The term “intellectual property” means—(A) trade secret; (B) 
invention, process, design, or plant protected under title 35 [re-
lating to patents]; (C) patent application; (D) plant variety; (E) 
work of authorship protected under title 17 [relating to copy-
rights]; or (F) mask work protected under chapter 9 of title 17 
[relating to microchips]; to the extent protected by applicable 
nonbankruptcy law.109 
The silence of section 101(35A) on trademarks left room for debate as to 
what to do with trademark licenses upon rejection, which was seemingly re-
solved by Mission.110  However, the decision was based in bankruptcy law 
and did not consider the impact in trademark law and potential policy viola-
tions.111  While some legal scholars have argued that the statute should be 
amended to incorporate “trademarks into the definition of intellectual prop-
erty in 11 U.S.C.S. § 101(35A),” to “create uniformity for all areas of intel-
lectual property,”112 trademarks are different from patents and copyrights in 
many respects, underscoring the importance for dissimilar treatment.113  One 
of the most notable differences is that trademarks are not separable from the 
underlying business, whereas with patents and copyrights, this is not the 
case.114  Therefore, it is reasonable to treat trademarks differently from other 
types of intellectual property and not apply a uniform rule to all. 
                                                          
107. In re Tempnology, LLC, 559 B.R. at 818–19.  
108. 11 U.S.C. § 101(35A). 
 109. Id.  
110. Mission Prod. Holdings, Inc. v. Tempnology, LLC, 139 S. Ct. 1652, 1661 (2019).  
111. Id.  
112. Victoria Elizabeth Jaworowski, Note, Stop the Silence: Why Bankruptcy Law Needs 
to Include Protection for Trademarks, 13 CHARLESTON L. REV. 365, 377 (2019).  
113. See generally Trademark, Patent, or Copyright?, U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK 
OFFICE, https://www.uspto.gov/trademarks-getting-started/trademark-basics/trademark-patent-or-
copyright [https://perma.cc/9XT3-JJJG].  
114. Id. 
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III. THE SPLIT 
Before the Supreme Court answered the question regarding what to do 
with trademark licenses upon bankruptcy rejection, a circuit split devel-
oped.115  In Sunbeam Products v. Chicago American Manufacturing LLC 
(“Sunbeam”), the Seventh Circuit held that rejection of a trademark license 
agreement during a bankruptcy did not terminate the licensee’s rights to use 
the trademark.116  In contrast, in Mission, the First Circuit held that rejection 
of a trademark license did terminate the licensee’s rights to use the trade-
mark.117   
A. Sunbeam Products v. Chicago American Manufacturing LLC 
In Sunbeam, Judge Easterbrook of the Seventh Circuit rejected Lubri-
zol by holding that “rejection did not terminate the licensee’s rights to use 
the trademarks.”118  Lakewood Engineering & Manufacturing Company 
(“Lakewood”), a box fan manufacturer, entered into a licensing agreement 
with Chicago American Manufacturing LLC (“CAM”), granting CAM the 
right to use Lakewood’s trademarks on its own production of box fans.119  
Under the contract, Lakewood was required “to provide CAM with motors 
and cord sets (CAM was to build the rest of the fan) and to pay for the com-
pleted fans that CAM drop-shipped to retailers.”120  When Lakewood began 
to struggle, “several of [its] creditors filed an involuntary bankruptcy petition 
against it” under Chapter 7.121 
                                                          
115. Sunbeam Prod., Inc. v. Chicago Am. Mfg., LLC, 686 F.3d 372, 377 (7th Cir. 2012); 
In re Tempnology, LLC, 879 F.3d 389, 392 (1st Cir. 2018), rev’d sub nom., Mission Prod. Hold-
ings, Inc. v. Tempnology, LLC, 139 S. Ct. 1652 (2019).   
116. Sunbeam, 686 F.3d. at 377. 
 117. In re Tempnology, LLC, 879 F.3d at 392.  
118. Robert L. Eisenbach, Throwing Shade at Sunbeam: Following Lubrizol and Not the 
Seventh Circuit, the First Circuit Leaves Another Trademark Licensee Rejected and out of Luck, 
COOLEY: IN THE (RED) (Jan. 22, 2018), https://bankruptcy.cooley.com/2018/01/articles/business-
bankruptcy-issues/throwing-shade-sunbeam-following-lubrizol-not-seventh-circuit-first-circuit-
leaves-another-trademark-licensee-rejected-luck/ [https://perma.cc/X4DQ-QF5U].  
119. Sunbeam, 686 F.3d. at 374. 
 120. Id. at 376.  
121. Id. at 374; 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY § 301 (Richard Levin & Henry J. Sommer 
eds., 16th ed. 2020); 15 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY § 15.01 (Richard Levin & Henry J. Sommer 
eds., 16th ed. 2020) (An involuntary petition occurs where a third-party holder of a claim petitions 
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The trustee sold Lakewood’s business at a bankruptcy auction and Sun-
beam bought the business, including Lakewood’s trademarks.122  However, 
the Chapter 7 trustee rejected the executory portion of the CAM contract.123  
CAM nonetheless continued to make and sell Lakewood-branded fans.124  
Sunbeam then filed an adversary action against CAM and argued “that CAM 
had to stop making and selling fans once Lakewood stopped having require-
ments for them.”125  The bankruptcy court held that the Chapter 7 trustee’s 
rejection of the trademark licensing agreement did not terminate the licen-
see’s right to continue using the mark, deciding on policy grounds that a 
licensor should not be able to “take back trademark rights it bargained 
away.”126 Sunbeam appealed.127 
In rejecting the Lubrizol holding, the Seventh Circuit looked to what 
would have happened outside of bankruptcy in the event of a licensor’s 
breach of contract.128  The Seventh Circuit stated that “[o]utside of bank-
ruptcy, a licensor’s breach does not terminate a licensee’s right to use intel-
lectual property.”129  To support its holding, the Seventh Circuit provided the 
following hypothetical: 
Suppose that, before the bankruptcy began, Lakewood had broken 
its promise by failing to provide the motors. CAM might have 
elected to treat that breach as ending its own obligations, . . . but 
it also could have covered in the market by purchasing motors and 
                                                          
for the bankruptcy of the debtor, whereas a voluntary petition is where a debtor files for bank-
ruptcy).  
122. Sunbeam, 686 F.3d. at 374. 
123. Id.; see also Chapter 7 – Bankruptcy Basics, supra note 66. (“[A] trustee gathers and 
sells the debtor’s nonexempt assets and uses the proceeds of such assets to pay holders of claims 
(creditors) in accordance with the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code.”).  
124. Sunbeam, 686 F.3d. at 374.  
125. Id. at 375.  
126. In re Lakewood Eng’g & Mfg. Co., 459 B.R. 306, 343–46 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2011).  
127. Sunbeam, 686 F.3d. at 375. 
128. Id. at 376.  
129. Id. 
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billed Lakewood for the extra cost. CAM had bargained for the 
security of being able to sell Lakewood-branded fans for its own 
account if Lakewood defaulted; outside of bankruptcy, Lakewood 
could not have ended CAM’s right to sell the box fans by failing 
to perform its own duties, any more than a borrower could end 
the lender’s right to collect just by declaring that the debt will not 
be paid.130 
It then concluded that “[w]hat § 365(g) does by classifying rejection as 
breach is establish that in bankruptcy, as outside of it, the other party’s rights 
remain in place.”131  The Seventh Circuit acknowledged that it created a cir-
cuit-split but reasoned that “[b]ecause the trustee’s rejection of Lakewood’s 
contract with CAM did not abrogate CAM’s contractual rights, this adver-
sary proceeding properly ended with a judgment in CAM’s favor.”132 
B. Mission Prod. Holdings, Inc. v. Tempnology, LLC 
The circuit split regarding what to do with a trademark license re-
mained until the Supreme Court decided Mission.  But before the issue 
reached the Supreme Court, the bankruptcy court in 2015 decided that a li-
censor’s bankruptcy rejection of a trademark agreement terminates the licen-
see’s right to continue using the trademark.133  The Bankruptcy Appellate 
Panel, (“BAP”) then reversed the bankruptcy court’s holding.134  The BAP 
decision was next appealed to the First Circuit, which reinstated the 
                                                          
130. Id. at 376–77.  
131. Id. at 377.  
132. Id. at 378. 
 133. In re Tempnology, LLC, 541 B.R. 1, 2 (Bankr. D.N.H. 2015).  
134. In re Tempnology LLC, 559 B.R. 809, 825 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2016).  A Bankruptcy 
Appellate Panel, or “BAP,” is an appellate court that hears appeals from a bankruptcy court.  Not 
every circuit has a BAP, and, for those that do, an appellant has a choice of appealing a bankruptcy 
court decision to either a district court judge or the circuit’s BAP.  A BAP is composed of three 
bankruptcy court judges, and a BAP decision gets appealed to the Circuit Court of Appeals.  From 
the Circuit Court of Appeals, a decision gets appealed to the US Supreme Court.  What is a Bank-
ruptcy Appellate Panel?, U.S. CTS.: NEWS (Nov. 26, 2012), https://www.uscourts.gov/news/2012
/11/26/court-insider-what-bankruptcy-appellate-panel [https://perma.cc/AE67-JDCU]. 
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bankruptcy court’s decision.135  Notably, the First Circuit rejected the Sev-
enth Circuit’s decision, thereby deepening the circuit split.136   
1. Case Background and The Bankruptcy Court Decision 
Tempnology, LLC was the creator of a chemical free fabric designed 
to keep wearers cool during exercise.137  Tempnology manufactured its 
clothing and accessories under the brand name “Coolcore.”138  Tempnology 
entered into an agreement with Mission Product Holdings, Inc. (“Mis-
sion”).139  The agreement provided Mission with certain rights, one of which 
was “a non-exclusive license” to use the Coolcore trademarks in the United 
States and around the world.140 
Tempnology then filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 11 and attempted 
to reject the license agreement.141  At the time, a minority of courts held that 
“‘Congress intended the bankruptcy courts to exercise their equitable powers 
to decide, on a case by case basis, whether trademark licensees may retain 
the rights listed under § 365(n).’”142  However, the bankruptcy court held 
that “the omission of trademarks from the definition of intellectual property 
in § 101(35A) indicates that Congress did not intend for them to be treated 
the same as the six identified categories,” and therefore, Mission’s rights to 
Tempnology’s trademarks and logos were terminated post-rejection.143  The 
bankruptcy court reasoned that most courts follow the “negative inference 
that the omission of trademarks from § 101(35A) means 
                                                          
 135. In re Tempnology, LLC, 879 F.3d 389, 405 (1st Cir. 2018), rev’d sub nom.; Mission 
Prod. Holdings, Inc. v. Tempnology, LLC, 139 S. Ct. 1652 (2019).  
136.  In re Tempnology, LLC, 879 F.3d at 404.  
137. Id. at 392.  
138. Id.  
139. Id.  
140. Id. at 393. 
141. Id. at 394.  
142.  In re Tempnology, LLC, 541 B.R. 1, 7 (Bankr. D.N.H. 2015) (quoting In re Crumbs 
Bake Shop, Inc., 522 B.R. at 772); see also In re Exide Techs., 607 F.3d 957 (3d Cir. 2010) (Ambro, 
J., concurring). 
143. In re Tempnology, LLC, 541 B.R. at 8.  
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that Lubrizol’s holding was not overruled with respect to trademark licenses 
and those rights are not afforded any protection under § 365(n).”144 
2. The BAP Decision 
Mission appealed from the bankruptcy court’s decision, and the BAP 
affirmed in part and reversed in part.145  While the BAP agreed with the 
bankruptcy court’s holding that “section 365(n) failed to protect Mission’s 
rights to [Tempnology’s] trademarks, it disagreed as to the effect of that con-
clusion.”146  The BAP reversed the bankruptcy court’s holding that rejection 
of the executory contract extinguished the licensee’s rights.147  The panel 
instead followed the Seventh Circuit’s ruling in Sunbeam that rejection does 
not terminate a licensee’s rights to use the trademark.148  The BAP reasoned 
that the rejection was in effect a breach of contract, which “does not neces-
sarily terminate a licensee’s rights” under nonbankruptcy law and similarly, 
under section 365(g) such rejection “likewise does not necessarily eliminate 
those rights.”149  Accordingly, the BAP “reversed the bankruptcy court’s de-
termination that Mission no longer had protectable rights in [Tempnology’s] 
trademarks.”150 
3. The First Circuit Decision 
The BAP decision was appealed again and the First Circuit held that 
Mission’s rights to use Tempnology’s trademarks did not survive rejec-
tion.151  The First Circuit based its decision on Congress’s supposedly 
                                                          
144. Id. at 7; see e.g., In re Old Carco LLC, 406 B.R. 180, 211 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009); In 
re Dynamic Tooling Sys., Inc., 349 B.R. 847, 856 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2006); In re HQ Global Hold-
ings, Inc., 290 B.R. 507, 513 (Bankr. D. Del. 2003); In re Centura Software Corp., 281 B.R. 660, 
674–75 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2002).  
145. In re Tempnology LLC, 559 B.R. 809, 825 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2016).  
146. In re Tempnology, LLC, 879 F.3d at 395. 
 147. Id.  
 148. Id.  
149. Id. 
 150. Id.  
151. Id.  
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intentional decision to exclude “trademarks” from the list of “intellectual 
property eligible for the protection of section 365(n),” especially since “rel-
atively obscure property” like “‘mask work protected under chapter 9 of title 
17’” is included on the list.152  The First Circuit also reasoned that because 
there is no “catchall or residual clause” it is not even plausible to infer the 
encompassment of forms of intellectual property other than those explicitly 
listed.153 
While the First Circuit acknowledged Sunbeam, it declined to follow 
in the Seventh Circuit’s footsteps on the grounds that “Congress’s principal 
aim in providing for rejection was to ‘release the debtor’s estate from bur-
densome obligations that can impede a successful reorganization.’”154  First 
Circuit Judge Torruella, in a dissenting opinion, argued that the BAP was 
“correct to follow the Seventh Circuit[]” in holding that a debtor’s rejection 
of a trademark license agreement “should be guided by the terms of the 
Agreement, and non-bankruptcy law, to determine the appropriate equitable 
remedy of the functional breach of contract.”155  He referred to the Senate 
Report to explain the purposeful omission of trademarks from section 
365(g).156  Judge Torruella contended that the omission was not intended to 
leave trademark licensees without protection, but rather to “allow more time 
to study.”157  He quoted the relevant portion of the Senate Report which pro-
vides: 
[T]he bill does not address the rejection of executory trademark[s] 
. . . While such rejection is of concern because of the interpreta-
tion of [§] 365 by the Lubrizol court and others, . . . such contracts 
raise issues beyond the scope of this legislation. In particular, 
trademark . . . relationships depend to a large extent on control of 
the quality of the products or services sold by the licensee. Since 
these matters could not be addressed without more extensive 
study, it was determined to postpone congressional action in this 
                                                          
152. Id. at 401.  
153. Id. 
 154. Id. at 402 (citing Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. at 528). 
 155. Id. at 407.  
156. Id. at 406.  
157. Id. (citing Sunbeam, 686 F.3d at 375).  
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area and to allow the development of equitable treatment of this 
situation by bankruptcy courts.158 
This language seems to suggest that trademarks should not be in the same 
basket as other types of intellectual property.  The excerpt from the Senate 
Report also undermines the holding in Mission, suggesting that it was incor-
rectly decided because there are so many differences between trademarks 
and other types of intellectual property, such as patents and copyrights.  Fur-
ther, Judge Torruella argued that the majority decision “makes bankruptcy 
more a sword than a shield, putting debtor-licensors in a catbird seat they 
often do not deserve.”159  Additionally, he argued that the majority effec-
tively took the role of the legislature “through the creation of bright-line rules 
in the face of congressional intent” when concluding that a “section 365(a) 
rejection eliminates a licensee’s rights to the bargained-for use of a debtor’s 
trademark effectively treats a debtor’s rejection as a contract cancellation, 
rather than a contractual breach, putting the court at odds with legislative 
intent.”160  Therefore, the dissent suggested that Tempnology’s rejection of 
the trademark license agreement with Mission should have been “guided by 
the terms of the Agreement, and non-bankruptcy law, to determine the ap-
propriate equitable remedy of the functional breach of contract.”161 
4. The Supreme Court Decision 
Finally, the Supreme Court granted certiorari and held that the debtor’s 
rejection of the trademark licensing agreement could not revoke the license 
and did not “deprive[] the licensee of its rights to use the trademark.”162  
Therefore, in the event of bankruptcy, the licensee has the option to assert 
damages or continue use of the mark.163  The Supreme Court reasoned that 
under 11 U.S.C. § 365, a “debtor’s rejection of an executory contract in 
bankruptcy ha[d] the same effect as a breach outside bankruptcy[,]” and thus, 
                                                          
158. Id. (citing S. REP. NO., 100-505, at 4–5). 
 159. Id. at 407; In re Exide Techs., 607 F.3d 957, 967–68 (3d Cir. 2010) (Ambro, J., con-
curring). 
 160. In re Tempnology, LLC, 879 F.3d at 407.  
161. Id.  
162. Mission Prod. Holdings, Inc. v. Tempnology, LLC, 139 S. Ct. 1652, 1657–58 (2019).  
163. Id. at 1659. 
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“[s]uch an act could not rescind rights that the contract previously 
granted.”164  As a result of such a breach, “the debtor and counterparty do 
not go back to their pre-contract positions,” but rather, “the counterparty re-
tains the rights it has received under the agreement,”165 meaning that licen-
sees can either assert damages arising from rejection of the contract or con-
tinue to use the mark post-rejection.  The Supreme Court noted that its 
holding is consistent with what happens in other contexts under section 
365.166  It offered as an example section 365(h), which provides that in the 
event a landlord files for bankruptcy and rejects a current lease, the tenant is 
not forced to move out but may continue to live and pay rent until the con-
clusion of the lease term.167 
In her concurrence, Justice Sotomayor pointed out that “[t]he Court 
does not decide that every trademark licensee has the unfettered right to con-
tinue using licensed marks postrejection.”168  The question of “whether the 
licensee’s rights would survive a breach under applicable non-bankruptcy 
law” remains.169  For example, within trademark law, issues such as naked 
licensing and consumer confusion could arise out of the majority decision.  
As will be explored below, these issues could be resolved either by contract 
or amendment of the current law.170   
                                                          
 164. Id. at 1666.  
165. Id. at 1662.  
166. Id. at 1663.  
167. Id. at 1659; 11 U.S.C. § 365(h) (2018) (providing that “If the trustee rejects an unex-
pired lease of real property under which the debtor is the lessor and— (i) if the rejection by the 
trustee amounts to such a breach as would entitle the lessee to treat such lease as terminated by 
virtue of its terms, applicable nonbankruptcy law, or any agreement made by the lessee, then the 
lessee under such lease may treat such lease as terminated by the rejection; or (ii) if the term of 
such lease has commenced, the lessee may retain its rights under such lease (including rights such 
as those relating to the amount and timing of payment of rent and other amounts payable by the 
lessee and any right of use, possession, quiet enjoyment, subletting, assignment, or hypothecation) 
that are in or appurtenant to the real property for the balance the term of such lease and for any 
renewal or extension of such rights to the extent that such rights are enforceable under applicable 
nonbankruptcy law.”).  
168. Mission, 139 S. Ct. at 1666.  
169. Id. 
 170. Id. at 1667.  The dissenting opinion by Justice Gorsuch argued that the court’s juris-
diction was in doubt so he would decline to proceed on the merits.  He also reasoned that the issue 
was moot because “after the bankruptcy court ruled, the license agreement expired by its own terms 
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IV. ANALYSIS 
While the Supreme Court decision in Mission attempted to resolve con-
fusion among the circuits and provide clarity for parties to licensing agree-
ments where the licensor files for bankruptcy, there are several unexplored 
repercussions.  For instance, as Justice Kagan noted in the majority opinion, 
the decision could create difficulty in the reorganization of trademark licen-
sors.171  Such a difficulty could lead to an inability to reorganize under Chap-
ter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code and a potential dissolution of the company 
altogether.  The decision also presents issues under Chapter 7 of the Bank-
ruptcy Code as the fate of the mark is unclear when sold at a bankruptcy 
auction due to concerns of naked licensing and/or consumer confusion.172  
As is proposed later in this section, potential solutions include additions or 
modifications to standard contract provisions as well as amendments to the 
Lanham Act and/or the Bankruptcy Code to ameliorate some of the negative 
aftereffects of the decision. 
A. Increased Difficulty in Reorganization of Trademark Licensors 
Mission held that “in the event that a bankrupt licensor rejects an intel-
lectual property license, section 365(n) allows a licensee to retain its licensed 
rights—along with its duties—absent any obligations owed by the debtor-
licensor.”173  This holding however, did not take into account the probability 
that a lack of adequate quality control may result when the debtor-licensor is 
relieved of its obligations under the agreement. 
In Mission, Tempnology argued that a reorganizing licensor would 
have to make a choice between expending scarce resources on quality control 
and risking the loss of a valuable asset at the hands of naked licensing.174  If 
a debtor-licensor is no longer able to engage in “quality control,” the license 
                                                          
so nothing [the court] might say here could restore Mission’s ability to use Tempnology’s trade-
marks. 
171. Id. at 1666.  
172. See generally Chapter 7 – Bankruptcy Basics, supra note 66; 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2018); 
1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 2:4 (5th 
ed. 2020). 
173. In re Tempnology LLC, 559 B.R. 809, 816 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2016) (citing In re Exide 
Techs., 607 F.3d 957 (3d Cir. 2010) (Ambro, J., concurring)).  
174. Mission, 139 S. Ct. at 1665.  
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will become a “naked” license175  If naked licensing occurs, the licensee may 
still be able to use the mark, but as could anyone else, making the debtor 
company less valuable.176  Such a choice makes reorganization more diffi-
cult. 
While Justice Kagan acknowledged that the decision might impede a 
trademark licensor’s ability to reorganize, she explained that this concern is 
trademark specific and not supported by section 365.177  Even if unsupported 
by section 365, the issue of increased difficulty of reorganization for trade-
mark licensors remains a possibility. 
The First Circuit in Mission pointed out that “the approach taken 
by Sunbeam entirely ignores the residual enforcement burden it would im-
pose on the debtor just as the Code otherwise allows the debtor to free itself 
from executory burdens.”178  As previously noted, one residual burden arises 
if the debtor-licensor is required to spend money to maintain the quality of 
the trademark.  Expending funds in bankruptcy to maintain the quality of a 
trademark creates difficulty for the debtor-licensor because there would nec-
essarily be less money to distribute to other creditors.  If this is the case, 
creditors will be less likely to vote to approve the debtor’s bankruptcy 
plan.179  Accordingly, it will be difficult for the debtor to get a discharge, 
which is in direct contravention with the Bankruptcy Code’s goal of provid-
ing a fresh start to debtors.180  “As the full measure of a debtor’s fresh start 
flowing from the bankruptcy is vital to Congress’ mission in enacting the 
Bankruptcy Code, anything which would frustrate the mission must be scru-
tinized carefully.”181   
                                                          
175.  GILSON LALONDE, supra note 13, § 6.07; 1 ANNE GILSON LALONDE, GILSON ON 
TRADEMARKS § 3.10 (2020).  
 176.  GILSON LALONDE, supra note 175, § 3.10.  
177. Mission, 139 S. Ct. at 1665.  
178. In re Tempnology, LLC, 879 F.3d 389, 404 (1st Cir. 2018), rev’d sub nom., Mission 
Prod. Holdings, Inc. v. Tempnology, LLC, 139 S. Ct. 1652 (2019).   
 179. 11 U.S.C. § 1129 (2018); Chapter 11 - Bankruptcy Basics, supra note 77.  
180. Chapter 11 - Bankruptcy Basics, supra note 77. 
 181. Cherise M. Wolas, Is the Debtor Left Standing When the Music Stops: Assumption and 
Rejection of Executory Recording Contracts by Insolvent Musicians, 9 LOY. ENT. L.J. 259, 282 
(1989).  
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The Intellectual Property Owners Association (“IPOA”), in its Amicus 
Brief to the Supreme Court, argued that the Court of Appeals overstated the 
meaning of quality control when considering the effects of the ability of the 
licensee to continue use of the mark, however, it acknowledged that quality 
control obligations could be quite burdensome.182  The IPOA further argued 
that “‘[o]nly minimal quality control’ is typically needed to avoid these con-
sequences.”183  However, the IPOA went on to explain that “[j]ust as im-
portant, adequate quality control ‘varies with the circumstances.’”184  It 
acknowledged the importance of consideration of the “type of goods or ser-
vices being licensed.”185  For instance, “consumers may expect greater qual-
ity consistency from a restaurant franchise than they expect from licensed 
merchandise for their favorite sports team.”186   
The IPOA made the concession that “some licensing arrangements may 
require a level or type of quality control that impedes the debtor-licensor 
from successfully reorganizing.”187  It argued that “‘there are already incen-
tives for licensees to maintain the licensor’s quality control provisions’ even 
where the licensor files a bankruptcy petition.”188  However, as explained 
above, this usually is not enough to maintain quality unless the licensor and 
licensee enjoy a special relationship. 
Additionally, if a plan is not approved by the creditors under Chapter 
11, the company may be forced to convert the case to Chapter 7, requiring a 
winding up of affairs, a sale of assets, and ultimately dissolution.189  A 
                                                          
182. Brief of the Intellectual Property Owners Association as Amicus Curiae in Support of 
Neither Party at *15–16, Mission Product Holdings, Inc. vs Tempnology, LLC, 587 U.S 397 (2018) 
(No. 17-1657). 
183. Id. at *13; Kentucky Fried Chicken Corp. v. Diversified Packaging Corp., 549 F.2d 
368, 387 (5th Cir. 1977).   
184. Brief of the Intellectual Property Owners Association as Amicus Curiae in Support of 
Neither Party, supra note 182, at *14; Edwin K. Williams & Co. v. Edwin K. Williams & Co.-
East., 542 F.2d 1053, 1060 (9th Cir. 1976).  
185. Brief of the Intellectual Property Owners Association as Amicus Curiae in Support of 
Neither Party, supra note 182, at *14.  
186. Id. at *14–15. 
187. Id. at *26.   
188. Id. at *16.  
189. Chapter 11 - Bankruptcy Basics, supra note 77.  
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Chapter 11 debtor chooses to file under Chapter 11 rather than Chapter 7 in 
order to remain in business and survive the bankruptcy process.190  If the 
debtor company cannot get a plan approved, the company may not survive 
and the business impact could be catastrophic.191  Conversion under Chapter 
7 means that employees would lose their jobs and stockholders would likely 
lose their investments since they are considered low priority creditors.192   
For example, Circuit City, a “superstore,” faced an inability to compete 
with popular stores like Best Buy, Home Depot, and Lowes, and filed for 
Chapter 11 bankruptcy in 2008 with the hopes of reorganizing to reduce costs 
and increase profitability.193  Because Circuit City could not meet the re-
quirements of the plan set by the court and its creditors, the company con-
verted the case under Chapter 7 and began to close all of its stores.194  Circuit 
City’s assets, along with its trademarks, were liquidated and sold at auc-
tion.195  While Circuit City’s assets were purchased in 2009 by a company 
called Systemax, it was not until 2018 that the company was revived, and 
revival is not a possibility for all companies that file for bankruptcy.196 
As Circuit City’s case illustrates, the Chapter 11 debtor’s chance at a 
fresh start and continued existence hinge on the ability to get a plan ap-
proved.  While there were no issues of quality control in Circuit City’s case, 
committing to engage in quality control under Chapter 11 may allow the 
mark to survive temporarily.  However, it is still possible that the case could 
be converted to a Chapter 7 liquidation, and such efforts to keep the trade-
mark alive could work to the company’s detriment by impeding its 
                                                          
190. Id.  
191. Chapter 11 - Bankruptcy Basics, supra note 77; 11 U.S.C. § 507 (2018). 
 192. 11 U.S.C. § 507.  
 193. See Karen Jacobs, Circuit City Files for Bankruptcy, REUTERS (Nov. 10, 2008), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-circuitcity/circuit-city-files-for-bankruptcy-
idUSTRE4A936V20081111 [https://perma.cc/GD57-ULQ5]. 
194. Karen Jacobs et al., Circuit City to Liquidate, Shutter Stores, REUTERS (Jan. 16, 2009), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-circuitcity/circuit-city-to-liquidate-shutter-stores-
idUSTRE50F1VW20090116 [https://perma.cc/WB3A-W2K8].  
195. THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF TRADEMARK TRANSACTIONS: A GLOBAL AND LOCAL 
OUTLOOK § 7.29 (Irene Calboli & Jacques De Werra eds., 2016).  
196. Lauren Thomas, Circuit City to Relaunch Online Next Month, with Stores on the Hori-
zon, CNBC (Jan. 9, 2018, 12:01 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/01/09/circuit-city-to-relaunch-
online-next-month-with-stores-on-the-horizon.html [https://perma.cc/8AK7-QM95]. 
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reorganization and forcing a wind up.  While a conversion and forced wind 
up may not always be the case, particularly if the costs of engaging in quality 
control are low, as further discussed below, possible solutions in this sce-
nario include placing a provision in the contract that allows the debtor-licen-
sor to reject the trademark license while simultaneously cutting off the licen-
see’s right to use the trademark.  However, this option has repercussions for 
licensees, particularly if they have invested time and money building their 
business around use of the trademark. 
Alternatively, if there are quality control measures in place by the pur-
chaser, the trademark may survive.197  A solution to this would include put-
ting a provision in the contract providing that in the event of bankruptcy of 
the licensor, the licensee would become the owner of the trademark.  How-
ever, a problem arises under this solution where the license is a non-exclu-
sive license, meaning that others also have the right to use the mark.198  For 
example, if Coca-Cola filed for bankruptcy, and it had executed a license of 
its word mark to a diner and a small manufacturer of apparel, and the mark 
survived bankruptcy, there would be an increased likelihood of consumer 
confusion because consumers would not know where the mark originated, 
and therefore, the source of the mark would be distorted.   
Even when the license is exclusive, if the licensor and licensee’s busi-
nesses are different, it may be impermissible to assign the mark to the licen-
see.199  Such an assignment would be to sell the mark separate from the un-
derlying product or service, which directly violates the rule against 
assignments in gross.200  Even if a trademark assignment “expressly assigns 
the goodwill associated with the trademark, the assignment may be ineffec-
tive if the assignee’s products are not nearly the same as the assignor’s 
goods.”201 Such a rule ensures “both continuity of type of goods and quality 
                                                          
197.  GILSON LALONDE, supra note 13, § 6.07; see also Barcamerica Int’l USA Tr. v. Ty-
field Imps., 289 F.3d 589, 595 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 198. 2 ANNE GILSON LALONDE, GILSON ON TRADEMARKS § 6.03 (2020).  
199. Scott D. Locke and Jessica J. Kastner, Violation of the Assignment-In-Gross Rule for 
Trademarks, LAW.COM, N.Y. L.J. (June 30, 2020, 10:35 AM), https://www.law.com
/newyorklawjournal/2020/06/30/violation-of-the-assignment-in-gross-rule-for-trademarks/?slre-
turn=20200927230217 [https://perma.cc/X5QT-KEAD]. 
 200. Id.  
 201. Id.  
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under the assigned trademark.”202  However, if the licensor and licensee have 
similar businesses then such a solution may work.203 
Notwithstanding permissibility, there may be scenarios where it does 
not make sense for a licensee to become the new owner of the trademark 
after bankruptcy of the licensor.  In the Coca-Cola illustration above, if Coca-
Cola filed for bankruptcy, it would make little sense for its valuable trade-
mark to transfer to the owner of the small apparel manufacturing company.  
Not only will the mark no longer be backed by the original trademark owner, 
losing its identification as to its source, but some licensees may lack the ne-
gotiating power to get such a provision into a contract due to their inferior 
bargaining position.  Thus, while assignment of ownership to the licensee 
upon bankruptcy of the licensor is possible in some scenarios, it may not 
always be a viable solution. 
The policy behind the law against naked licensing focuses on protec-
tion from consumer confusion, promotion of fair competition, and protection 
of goodwill.204  Allowing trademark licensees to continue use of a trademark 
after the licensor has filed for bankruptcy may give rise to consumer confu-
sion because the source of the goods or services at issue may be distorted if 
a debtor no longer has the ability to supervise a licensee’s use of a mark.205  
This option may violate the underlying policy of trademark law, which is 
rooted in the “public’s interest in not being misled as to the origin and quality 
of goods that consumers buy.”206  Whether a lack of quality control comes 
from the reorganization, dissolution, or sale of a company, the potential for 
abandonment as a result of naked licensing lingers because trademark own-
ers are obligated “to control the quality of goods or services provided under 
the licensed trademark.”207   
                                                          
202. Id.  
203. Id. 
 204. 1 ANNE GILSON LALONDE, GILSON ON TRADEMARKS § 1.03 (2020). 
 205.  Id.; Smith, supra note 79, at 290.  
 206.  In re Tempnology, LLC, 879 F.3d 389, 404 (1st Cir. 2018), rev’d sub nom., Mission 
Prod. Holdings, Inc. v. Tempnology, LLC, 139 S. Ct. 1652 (2019). 
207. Tom Kulik, Leaving a Mark II: Why Trademark Licensees Need to Beware the Hold-
ing in Mission Products Holdings v. Tempnology, LLC, ABOVE THE LAW (June 10, 2019, 4:48 
PM), https://abovethelaw.com/2019/06/leaving-a-mark-ii-why-trademark-licensees-need-to-be-
ware-the-holding-in-mission-products-holdings-v-tempnology-llc/ [http://archive.today/hR17t]. 
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B. Amendment of the Lanham Act 
A possible solution to the loss of the of trademark rights where there is 
a lack of quality control by the licensor is a congressional amendment of the 
Lanham Act to include an exception in the event a trademark licensor files 
for bankruptcy.  Such a provision could state: “In context of bankruptcy, li-
censees will maintain the right to use the mark irrespective of supervision or 
lack thereof, for a specified period so long as the licensee maintains the qual-
ity of the products or services.”  This specific carve-out will provide more 
latitude to a licensee in the event that the licensor files for bankruptcy, al-
lowing the mark to survive the bankruptcy and alleviate some of the risk that 
arises out of the Mission decision.  This exception would also coincide with 
trademark policy because if equivalent quality is maintained, the mark will 
continue to serve as a source identifier, protect goodwill, avoid consumer 
confusion, and promote fair competition.208 
Further, the exception could include an additional time limit that begins 
to run at the date of filing of the bankruptcy petition in order to prevent an 
unfair disadvantage to the licensee.  Currently, under the Lanham Act, the 
presumption of abandonment arises after three consecutive years of non-
use.209  In 1996, Congress amended the code to expand the time limit to three 
years rather than the two years of nonuse.210  This legislative history indi-
cates that there came a point when two years was deemed insufficient, pos-
sibly justifying an additional time period in the context of bankruptcy.  An 
additional time limit will allow licensees who may have expended a signifi-
cant amount of funds in connection with the sale and marketing of their prod-
ucts the time to plan and begin thinking about other options. 
However, in the event of Chapter 7 liquidation, it is unclear whether 
the mark would survive.  This uncertainty lies in the fact that the asset may 
either be purchased or abandoned.211  In the scenario where the company 
dissolves and the licensor’s rights under the agreement are sold at auction, 
                                                          
 208.  GILSON LALONDE, supra note 204, § 1.03.  
 209. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2018).  
210. Sandra Edelman, Why Wait Three Years? Cancellation of Lanham Act Section 44(e) 
and 66(a) Registrations Based on Non-Use Prior to the Three-Year Statutory Period for Presump-
tion of Abandonment, 104 THE TRADEMARK ASS’N 1366, 1372 n.29 (2014).  
211. Process - Bankruptcy Basics, supra note 6.  
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the mark may become abandoned if there is a lack of quality control by the 
new purchaser.212   
C. The Best Option to Overcome the Issues with the Mission 
Decision 
As previously noted, in bankruptcy, the core policy is to help the un-
fortunate but honest debtor achieve its fresh start.213  In trademark law, the 
core policies are to ensure consumer recognition as to the source of goods 
and services, to promote fair competition, and to protect the goodwill of the 
business.214  However, these policies have been undermined by the Supreme 
Court’s holding in Mission.  To achieve a result in line with the policies un-
derlying both trademark law and bankruptcy law, Congress will need to over-
ride and fix the holding in Mission.  As Justice Sotomayor pointed out, the 
impact of the decision on restructuring licensors may be significant, but that 
impact did not alter the outcome of the case.215  Rather, the Supreme Court 
left “Congress with the option to tailor a provision for trademark licenses, as 
it has repeatedly in other contexts.”216 
D. Advice to Practitioners 
In the absence of a congressional response to Mission, attorneys of li-
censors could negotiate termination rights in the event the licensor files for 
bankruptcy causing “contract law principles . . . [to] determine the parties’ 
respective rights.”217  To illustrate, licensors may try to contract around the 
decision by inserting a provision that includes language as simple as: “in the 
event the Licensor files bankruptcy and rejects the trademark licensing 
agreement, the Licensee’s right to continued use of the trademark will 
                                                          
212.  GILSON LALONDE, supra note 13, § 6.07. 
213. See discussion supra Part II.B. 
 214.  GILSON LALONDE, supra note 204, § 1.03. 
215. Mission Prod. Holdings, Inc. v. Tempnology, LLC, 139 S. Ct. 1652, 1667 (2019) (So-
tomayor, concurring).  
216. Id.  
217. Michael J. Kasdan, Sapna W. Palla & Kristyn Hansen, In Landmark Decision, Su-
preme Court Rules Trademark Licensees Retain Rights Even After Rejection by Licensor in Bank-
ruptcy, NAT’L L. REV. (May 28, 2019), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/landmark-decision-
supreme-court-rules-trademark-licensees-retain-rights-even-after [https://perma.cc/T7P9-AU26].  
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terminate upon rejection.”  As noted above, such a provision could be the 
difference between a debtor-licensor surviving bankruptcy and not surviv-
ing.   
Indeed, a contract provision such as the one above would let a licensor 
terminate a licensing agreement upon filing bankruptcy, which could reduce 
its quality control obligations and potentially allow the licensor to renegoti-
ate the licensing agreement or find a new licensee.  The reduction of quality 
control obligations would free up precious resources to allocate to creditors 
under a Chapter 11 plan.  The potential renegotiation of the licensing agree-
ment would give the debtor the chance to possibly bring more money into 
the estate, which could also be used to repay creditors.  This termination 
would therefore allow the debtor to propose a Chapter 11 plan that would 
allocate more money to creditors and would be more likely to get approved 
through the voting process.  Such a provision would likely put the licensee 
in a position to negotiate for a lesser royalty rate to alleviate the risk of a 
potential bankruptcy by the licensor. 
In the absence of such contract provisions, debtors would have less 
money to allocate to creditors, making plan rejection and conversion to 
Chapter 7 more likely in instances where the debtor may not have enough 
funds to get a plan confirmed.218  Conversion would be disastrous to the 
Chapter 11 debtor because it would result in the cessation of the debtor’s 
business.  Licensors’ attorneys therefore need to be aware of the downstream 
risk to their clients if such provisions are not negotiated—leaving the Mis-
sion holding intact could make the difference between the client’s survival 
and dissolution.  Courts should be willing to uphold such provisions to pro-
vide licensors a better chance to reorganize and survive bankruptcy.   
Another reason that courts should help debtors reorganize is that cred-
itors must either accept a debtor’s Chapter 11 plan or receive at least as much 
money under the Chapter 11 plan as they would under a Chapter 7 liquida-
tion.219  Because creditors will often receive more under a Chapter 11 reor-
ganization than they would under a Chapter 7 liquidation—and never less—
it is in the interest of creditors for the debtor to be able to reorganize.220 
                                                          
 218. See generally Chapter 11 - Bankruptcy Basics, supra note 77.  
219. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7) (2018).  
220. Id.  
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However, while it has been argued that “monetary damages for breach 
are more than sufficient remedies for Mission under § 365,”221 the option to 
continue use of the trademark may be important because claims made against 
a bankruptcy estate are often paid only cents on the dollar, “making it likely 
that a continuing license is far more valuable to the licensee.”222  In fact, it is 
possible that the licensee might not be entitled to any payment at all.223  
When a debtor files for bankruptcy, the creditors are grouped into classes 
and ordered in terms of priority.224  For example, in corporate bankruptcies, 
attorneys and other professionals are priority “administrative expense claim-
ants” under section 507(a)(2) and will get paid in full before all other credi-
tors.225  Unsecured trademark licensees are non-priority creditors that are 
paid only after priority creditors have been paid in full.226 
As an alternative to a provision allowing a licensor to terminate a li-
censee’s rights to use a mark upon the licensor’s bankruptcy filing, the con-
tract could contain a term which provides that a licensor be required to pro-
vide a written commitment to continue to maintain quality control or to 
“agree to assign the trademark (and any registration) to the licensee” upon 
insolvency of the licensor.227  A licensing agreement could also require that 
                                                          
 221. Smith, supra note 79, at 303.  
222. In Mission Product Ruling, Supreme Court Clarifies Longstanding Circuit Split on 
Effects of Bankruptcy on Trademark Licenses, IPWATCHDOG (May 20, 2019), https://www.ip-
watchdog.com/2019/05/20/mission-product-ruling-supreme-court-clarifies-longstanding-circuit-
split-effects-bankruptcy-trademark-licenses/id=109440/ [https://perma.cc/79J5-7G4N].  
223. Id.  
224. 11 U.S.C. § 507 (stating that “(a) [t]he following expenses and claims have priority in 
the following order: (1) First (A) Allowed unsecured claims for domestic support obligations . . . 
(C) If a trustee is appointed . . . the administrative expenses of the trustee . . . (2) Second, adminis-
trative expenses[,] . . . unsecured claims of any Federal reserve bank[,] . . . and any fees and 
charges assessed against the estate under chapter 123 of title 28. (3) Third, unsecured claims al-
lowed under section 502(f) of this title. (4) Fourth, allowed unsecured claims, but only to the extent 
of $10,000 for each individual or corporation . . . for— (A) wages, salaries, or commissions . . . or 
(B) sales commissions earned by an individual or by a corporation with only 1 employee, acting as 
an independent contractor in the sale of goods or services for the debtor in the ordinary course of 
the debtor’s business . . . .”).   
225. Id.  
226. Id. 
227. Milton Springut, Supreme Court Bankruptcy Decision Has Major Impact on Trade-
marks and Licenses, LAW.COM: N.Y. L.J. (June 12, 2019), https://www.law.com
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“if the licensor cannot commit to doing so, the licensor would appoint the 
licensee as its agent to file renewals with the Trademark Office and fees in-
curred deducted from any royalties due[,]” and the licensee will maintain 
quality.228  This may give the licensor the opportunity to eliminate expensive 
obligations and allow the licensee to continue using the mark. 
Nonetheless, in light of the potential for consumer confusion and naked 
licensing resulting from a lack of supervision post-bankruptcy, the decision 
in Mission, “[a]s a practical matter, [] may lead to higher licensing fees to 
account for the greater risk on the part of the licensor.”229  Attorneys of li-
censors may also try to push for agreements with shorter terms to prevent 
“further degradation of the debtor’s fresh start options” in the event that a 
licensor becomes obligated, upon filing bankruptcy, to expend scarce finan-
cial resources to maintain the quality of the mark for an extended period of 
time.230  For now, attorneys for parties to a licensing agreement must be 
aware of the bankruptcy implications of the Mission holding and prepare to 
address them in contract negotiations to give their clients the best possible 
representation.   
V. CONCLUSION 
While the Mission decision is seemingly licensee friendly, there are 
several undesirable results that arise out of the decision, which include an 
undermining of the twin aims of the Bankruptcy Code, as well as the likeli-
hood of consumer confusion, naked licensing, abandonment, and even dis-
solution of the debtor.  Consequently, it is crucial that practitioners remain 
aware of the potential effect that could result from Mission.  As noted above, 
the case may have tremendous implications for reorganizing licensors.  At-
torneys for trademark licensors should try to negotiate for provisions in 
trademark licensing agreements, such as termination of a licensee’s right to 
use the mark, in order to contract around the holding in Mission (to the extent 
                                                          
/newyorklawjournal/2019/06/12/supreme-court-bankruptcy-decision-has-major-impact-on-trade-
marks-and-licenses/ [https://perma.cc/TCD7-YJHS]. 
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229. Anthony J. Dreyer et al., US Supreme Court Holds That Bankrupt Companies Cannot 
Rescind Trademark Licenses, SKADDEN (May 21, 2019), https://www.skadden.com/insights/pub-
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 230. In re Tempnology, LLC, 879 F.3d 389, 404 (1st Cir. 2018), rev’d sub nom., Mission 
Prod. Holdings, Inc. v. Tempnology, LLC, 139 S. Ct. 1652 (2019).   
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this is permissible).  Attorneys for trademark licensees should try to ensure 
that their clients get something in return for such provisions to create a mu-
tually beneficial bargain, such as a lower royalty rate to account for the risk 
of loss.  If the parties do not agree to such a provision, or if such a provision 
is unenforceable, then the licensee will be able to continue using the trade-
mark, even upon the licensor’s rejection of the agreement in bankruptcy, 
which may open the doors for the problems set forth above. 
In the absence of such provisions, congressional intervention will likely 
be necessary.231  Otherwise, the twin aims of the Code will not be met with 
regard to trademark licensing agreements, companies could be wound up, 
employees could lose their jobs, and investors could lose their investments.  
Congress could amend the Bankruptcy Code by adding a trademark-specific 
provision as suggested by Justice Sotomayor.  Alternatively, Congress could 
amend the Lanham Act to include an exception to the rule regarding naked 
licensing in the context of bankruptcy.  For now, congressional intervention 
of the bankruptcy and trademark codes may be premature.   
While there is still no perfect solution or ideal rule for both licensors 
and licensees for now, if practitioners—especially those who represent trade-
mark licensors—remain aware of the issues discussed in this Comment, and 
negotiate prudently, they will be able to craft a mutually beneficial agree-
ment for their clients that avoids the dangers created by Mission. 
                                                          
 231. Menell, supra note 72, at 754 (2007) (“[S]ection 365(e)(1) invalidates any termination 
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trustee.”); see 11 U.S.C. § 365(e) (2018).  But see F. Scott Kieff & Troy A. Paredes, An Approach 
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